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This chapter is both a retrospective, and also even a requiem, for the ‘unregulation’
argument in Internet law in the past twenty-five years, and a prospective on the next
twenty-five years of computer (or cyber) law,1 in whichmany of the expert treatises of
the 1990s need to be dusted down and reabsorbed.2
The global communications network connected by the Internet Protocol has trans-
formed the consumer/prosumer and small business experience of electronic
communication.3 The Internet is not a lawless, special unregulated zone; it never
was.4 Now that broadband Internet is ubiquitous, mobile, and relatively reliable in
urban and suburban areas, it is being regulated as all mass media before it. The major
gatekeepers are regulated for the public good and public interest, whether that be access
providers through infrastructure sharing, electronic privacy, cybersecurity and network
* I wish to thank the contributors to this edited collection and its editor, the panelists and participants at
theWharton School symposium “After the Digital Tornado” on 10November 2017, and participants at
the Georgetown Technology Law Review symposium on 23 February 2018 on “Platform Law,”
especially Julie Cohen andMireille Hildebrandt. I also wish to thank the contributors and participants
at the Münster Institute for Information and Telecommunications Law twentieth anniversary sympo-
sium in Berlin, Germany on 15 July 2017, especially Bernd Holznagel, and the contributors and
participants at the eleventh annual Gikii symposium in Winchester, England, on 15 September 2017,
especially Lilian Edwards, Andres Guadamuz, Paul Bernal, Daithi MacSithigh, and Judith Rauhofer.
All errors and omissions remain my own.
1 Eastham, Laurence (2011) Interview with SCL’s New President, Richard Susskind, Society for
Computers and Law, 23 August, at www.scl.org/articles/2191-interview-with-scl-s-new-president-
richard-susskind. See also Susskind, Richard (2018) Sir Henry Brooke – A Tribute, Society for
Computers and Law, at www.scl.org/articles/10221-sir-henry-brooke-a-tribute.
2 A good introduction is Reed, Chris (2010) Making Laws for Cyberspace, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, especially at pp. 29–47.
3 See generally for European law, Edwards, Lilian (ed., 2018) Law, Policy, and the Internet, Oxford: Hart
Publishing; for US law, Goldman, Eric (2018) Internet Law Cases and Materials. For an annotated
bibliography of classic academic legal writing, see Marsden, Chris (2012) Internet Law, Oxford
Bibliographies Online, New York: Oxford University Press.
4 For early UK cases, see Athanasekou, P. E. (1998) Internet andCopyright: An Introduction toCaching,
Linking and Framing, Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT); Opinion of Lord Hamilton
in The Shetland Times Ltd v. Dr Jonathan Wills and Zetnews Ltd. Court of Session, Edinburgh
24 October 1996, at www.linksandlaw.com/decisions-87.htm.
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neutrality regulation, or the social media, e-commerce and search giants through
various duties of care including those for notice and rapid action – in many cases,
requiring takedown of allegedly illegal material in a day or even an hour,5 and
notification of breach of security and privacy to the customer.6 An Internet law expert
arriving in a time machine from the mid-1990s would find all this quite shocking.
We have now come full circle from computer law prior to the Internet’s explain-
ing the importance of robotics, cybernetics, and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
in the 1980s; to an explanation of the Internet’s impact on the law in the 1990s that
ranged across the entire syllabus including constitutional law and jurisprudence;7 to
more specialist examinations of law in such areas as intellectual property and
telecommunications in the 2000s; to a realization that the future was delayed not
denied and that cyberlaw is vital to understanding regulation of platforms, of
artificial intelligence and robotics, of blockchains, of automated vehicles, and of
disinformation in our democracies.
The 2020s will finally be the decade of cyberlaw, not as ‘law of the horse’, but as
digital natives finally help bring the law syllabus, legal practice, and even legislatures
into the Information Society.
In the first part of the chapter, I explain how the cyberlawyers of the 1990s dealt with
regulation of the then novel features of the public Internet. Internet law was a subject of
much interest in the 1990s in the US, and some specialist interest in UK and Europe.
In Part 2, I explain the foundational rules for the adaptation of liability online
initially focused on absolving intermediaries of legal responsibility for end user-
posted content. This exceptionalist approach gradually gave way. While some US
authors are hamstrung by a faith in the myth of the superuser and somewhat benign
intentions of corporations as opposed to federal and state government, there has
been a gradual convergence on the role of regulated self-regulation (or co-
regulation)8 on both sides of the Atlantic.9
In Part 3, I argue that the use of co-regulation has been fundamentally embedded
since European nations began to enforce these rules, with limited enforcement in
5 European Commission (2017) Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards an
Enhanced Responsibility of Online Platforms; European Commission (2018) Recommendation on
Measures to Effectively Tackle Illegal Content Online, published 1 March.
6 Belli, Luca and Zingales, Nicolo (eds. 2017) Platform Regulations: How Platforms Are Regulated and
How They Regulate Us, FGV Direito Rio, Brazil, at https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/
10438/19402.
7 An excellent review is provided by chapters 1–3 in Murray, Andrew and Reed, Chris (2018) Rethinking
the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
8 Holznagel, Bernd and Hartmann, Sarah (2017) Do Androids Forget European Sheep? – The CJEU’s
Concept of a ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ and the German Perspective, in Russel Miller (ed.) Privacy and
Power – A Transatlantic Dialogue in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 586–614.
9 See, for instance, Frischmann, Brett, M. (2005) An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 89, 917–1030, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=588424, dis-
cussed in Marsden, Chris (2017) Network Neutrality: From Policy to Law to Regulation, Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
36 Marsden
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108610018
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 82.18.162.22, on 02 Nov 2020 at 14:52:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
which judges and regulators stated that business models largely focused on encoura-
ging illegal posting would not be protected. Settled policy on liability, privacy, trust,
encryption, open Internet policies against filtering, were arrived at as a result of
expert testimony and exhaustive hearings.
Finally, in Part 4, I argue that hanging those policies on awhim results in potentially
catastrophic results in terms of untying the Gordian knots of intermediary safe
harbour, privacy, copyright enforcement, and open Internet European regulations.
It is often forgotten that the Werbach’s ‘Digital Tornado’ paper10 heralded
a model of limited state regulation, but very substantial responsible collective self-
regulation (‘consensus and running code’) within transnational law.11 When that
pact was broken by 4Chan script kiddies and two billion Facebook users, it moved
regulation away from the responsible collectivism of the pioneers’ Internet.
There were three views of regulation in 1997: the type of self-regulation I have
described; a belief in state regulation by those existing vested interests in broadcast,
telecommunications and newspapers; and a third view that state regulation was
inevitable as the Internet became ubiquitous but needed to be as reflexive and
responsive as could be maintained with human rights responsibilities.
The perspective of today allows us to rethink the apparent triumph of the first
view. If 2018 can in retrospect be seen as the year that the ‘Tech Bros’ view of
regulation faltered and was replaced (to some extent) by state and supranational
intervention, then the third option, of what I describe as co-regulation, appears to be
supplanting that self-regulation option.12 The state intervention was most notable in
both scale and scope in European Union law, for data protection, consumer/
prosumer protection, and also for competition enforcement.
part 1: 1990s’ history of internet law
The Internet was developed in the 1960s at a group of research institutes in the United
States and the United Kingdom.13 The Internet is a network of approximately 50,000
10 Werbach, Kevin (1997) Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy, Federal
Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policies Working Paper 29. Washington, FCC.
11 See most recently, Mahler, Tobias (2019) Generic Top-Level Domains: A Study of Transnational
Private Regulation (Elgar Studies in Law and Regulation) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. See also
Marsden, Chris (forthcoming) Transnational Information Law, in Peer Zumbansen (ed.) Oxford
Handbook of Transnational Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12 For co-regulation, see Senden, Linda A. J. (2005) Soft Law, Self-regulation andCo-regulation inEuropean
Law:Where do theyMeet?, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2005, at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=943063; Marsden, Chris (2011) Internet Co-Regulation, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Historically, see the Max Planck Institute study: Collin, Peter (2016) Justice without the
State within the State: Judicial Self-Regulation in the Past and Present,Moderne Regulierungsregime, Vol.
5, IX, 373.
13 Clark, David D., Field, Frank, and Richards, Matt (2010)Computer Networks and the Internet: A Brief
History of Predicting Their Future, CSAIL Working Paper, at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/People/
DDC/Working%20Papers.html; first international links were from the United States to Norway, see
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autonomous systems, which are interconnected by the Internet Protocol. The Internet
became an information network of critical mass in the 1990s with the rise of Bulletin
Board Services (BBS),14 still more so with the growth of commercial Internet service
providers (ISPs) in the late 1980s, and eventually a mass market artefact with the
development of the World Wide Web (‘WWW’) and release of commercial web
browsers in 1993–1994. The Internet developed as a self-regulated academic network,15
and its emergence as a commercial platform that would rapidly permeate through
society was largely unpredicted.16 Kahin and Nesson explained that the development
of the Internet was bottomup and self-regulatory, and explored the emerging tensions as
other nation-states began to assert a regulatory role.17
Internet growth, together with its increasing commercial exploitation, was accom-
panied by an explosive growth in United States’ scholarship. In 1993, Reidenberg
explained that information had become an international commodity, ill served by
existing legal frameworks poorly adapted due to their focus on the tangible aspects of
information-intensive products and insufficient attention to the intangible aspects of
information content.18 Reidenberg extended the argument that technology can
create an environment in the absence of legal rules in his ground-breaking concep-
tion of lex informatica. In the absence of ex ante sovereign power and legal rules,
technology can symbiotically create de facto commercial regulation in much the
same way as the mediaeval lex mercatoria.19 He extensively spelled out the use of
technology as a parallel form of regulation.
Building on Reidenberg’s insights, Johnson and Post made the classic argument
for the Internet as a borderless self-regulatory medium that should be permitted to
develop with less of the state-imposed restrictions that impeded the growth and
development of earlier media.20 The growth of the application of law to its
Brown, Ian (ed., 2012) Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
chapter 1.
14 Goldman, Eric S. (1994) Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:
Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, Hastings Comm/Ent Law
Journal, Vol. 16, 87.
15 Clark, David D. and Blumenthal, Marjory S. (2011) The End-to-End Argument and Application
Design: The Role of Trust, Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 16, 357–70.
16 De Sola Pool, Ithiel (1983) Technologies of Freedom, Harvard: Harvard University Press. Pool analyzed
the confrontation between the regulators of the new communications technology and the First
Amendment, presciently forecasting the legal conflict that the Internet created between freedom of
expression and government control/censorship. See also Kahin, Brian and Keller, James H. (eds.,
1997) Coordinating the Internet, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
17 Kahin, Brian and Nesson, Charles (eds., 1997) Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the
Global Information Infrastructure, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
18 Reidenberg, Joel (1993) Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade &
Technical Paradigms, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6, 287, at http://jolt
.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v06/06HarvJLTech287.pdf.
19 Reidenberg, Joel (1998) Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through
Technology, Texas Law Review, Vol. 76, 553–93.
20 Johnson, D. and Post, D. (1996) Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, Stanford Law
Review, Vol. 48, 1367–75.
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emergence was also unpredictable, although Johnson and Post argued for an
‘exceptionalism’ to permit this globalized unregulated medium to grow unfettered
by state censorship, which they saw as both normatively and substantively unjusti-
fied. They drew on United States’ constitutional law and history in the argument.
They suggest a structured, principled, and internationally acceptable manner for
national legislators to respond to the Internet. Lessig, while rejecting excessive state
intervention, warned that self-regulation could lead to an Internet controlled by
corporate interests.21 Lessig argued that state forbearance was rapidly resulting in
private regulation by new monopolies, to supplement the existing regulation by
technical protocols.
Although cyber-exceptionalism became the dominant viewpoint among scholars,
it was not without its opponents. Goldsmith made a legal positivist stand against the
Post-Johnson Internet exceptionalism, seeing as both normatively and substantively
flawed any ‘claim that cyberspace is so different from other communication media
that it will, or should, resist all governmental regulation’.22He asserted that it can be
regulated, including via conflict of laws rules, although this is not a normative
position on whether law should utilize its tools to regulate the Internet. In an early
trans-Atlanticist article arguing against Internet exceptionalism and reactive
national Internet regulation, Mayer-Schönberger and Foster argued that the global
information infrastructure limits both absolutists and regulators.23 The emerging
internationalization of the Internet would lead to both jurisdictional conflicts as well
as a clash of rights principles, as foreseen by Mayer-Schönberger and Foster.
Samuelson argued persuasively that legislators must ensure that the impending
rule making for the Internet is proportional in both economic and human rights
terms to the needs and demands of users, as well as coordinated internationally.24
Samuelson accepted the rise of the state, the need for sovereign intervention, and the
efficiency self-regulation had provided, in arguing for principles for legislating on
the Internet.
There have been extensive discussions as to the provenance of a field termed
‘Internet’ or ‘cyber’ law since the mid-1990s. As the law was colonizing the meta-
phorical “cyberspace” – communications between computer users over the
Internet – most of the most authoritative and pioneering legal scholarship with
regard to the new medium dates to the 1990s. Several offline subjects have them-
selves incorporated large literatures from their digital form, including intellectual
property, non-networked computer law, telecommunications, privacy, cybercrime,
21 Lessig, Lawrence (2006)Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic Books. Revised 2nd ed.
titled Code v2.0, at http://codev2.cc/.
22 Goldsmith, Jack L. (1998) Against Cyberanarchy, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 65, 1199.
23 Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor and Foster,Teree E. (1997) A Regulatory Web: Free Speech and the
Global Information Infrastructure,Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, Vol.
3, 45, at www.mttlr.org/volthree/foster.pdf.
24 Samuelson, P. (2000) Five Challenges for Regulating the Global Information Society, in
Chris, Marsden (ed.) Regulating the Global Information Society, Routledge: London.
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and media content regulation. As the Internet was ‘born global’ but first became
widely deployed in the United States, much of the literature has a bias in that
direction.
Many argue that the effects of digital information retrieval on the law applies
across all areas with some relevance, especially for intellectual property, and that
Internet law should be considered part of the law of contracts, competition, the
Constitution, and so on, with narrow exceptions for such issues as legal informatics,
and telecommunications law, which are being transformed by technology, and
therefore cannot remain distinct25. Easterbrook famously argued along these lines
that there is no field of ‘Internet law’, any more than there is the ‘law of the horse’.26
Lessig responded that the transformative effects of the Internet on law, in areas
including free expression, privacy, and intellectual property, are such that it offers
lawyers a radically new route to thinking about private regulation and globalization,
the limits of state action, as well as a powerful metaphor for explaining these wider
changes to law students.27 Sommer dismissed Lessig’s claims regarding the excep-
tionalism of cyberlaw, arguing that ‘a lust to define the law of the future’ is
dangerous, and can create bad taxonomy and bad legal analysis.28
Academics have constantly argued that the lack of general academic expertise and
the emergence of the field mean that Internet law is a necessary short-term distinct
study area, which may eventually be reintegrated into its constituent parts, as an
inevitable eventual assimilation. Kerr explained two divergent views of Internet law.
The first is an internalized expert view of the law, the second a technophobic view.
Kerr concluded that two perspectives will converge and evolve, as more people
understand the underlying technologies involved, and the useful middle ground.29
In a survey essay into the origins of the Internet law debate, Guadamuz argued that
several new fields are emerging from the study of computers and law, including legal
informatics, artificial intelligence (AI) and law, and that Internet law can provide
new insights into established fields that provide contemporary context for the
theoretical study of several subjects, and the profession’s development as a whole.30
Guadamuz argued that the ‘Attack of the Killer Acronym’ was preventing accessi-
bility to Internet law for the wider legal profession, clients (and faculty).
25 Marsden, C. (2010) Network Neutrality: Towards a Co-Regulatory Solution, London: Bloomsbury, at
216–19.
26 Easterbrook, Frank H. (1996) Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, Chicago: University of Chicago
Legal Forum, 207.
27 Lessig, Lawrence (1999) The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 113, 501.
28 Sommer, Joseph H. (2000) Against Cyberlaw, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 15, 3, at www
.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol15/sommer/sommer.html.
29 Kerr, Orin S. (2003) The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 91,
357, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=310020.
30 Guadamuz, Andrés (2004) Attack of the Killer Acronyms: The Future of IT Law, International Review
of Law, Computers & Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 411–24.
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Larouche later argued that the object of information law has mutated, scope
for public intervention has been rolled back, implementation of any form of
public intervention has been made more difficult, and that information law has
seen its main topics expropriated by more traditional topics. The law syllabus is
being digitized, literally (e-books, e-syllabi, e-libraries). He predicted the end of
Internet law as a subject and the abstraction of information law to move away
from a specific technology (except telecoms, media law). As a result, he argued
that a ‘future information law’ will be radically amended.31 Goldman argued for
an Internet law that can be taught using new pedagogical elements employed
on a survey-type course, and argued against Easterbrook that the volume of
Internet-specific legislation and case law means that common law cannot
provide a sufficient grounding for students to understand the transformations
wrought by Internet law.32
Specialization happened to some extent, with e-commerce part of standard
contract law, platform dominance in competition law, digital copyright (and
patent) law, cybercrime in criminal law, and so on, as Murray described.33
Some of the more interesting specialist Internet law academic literature from
the 1990s (and early 2000s) has also stood the test of time,34 for instance, on
network effects,35 cyberlaw, and control by code or lex informatica,36 free and
open source software and control of the online environment,37 network neu-
trality and the regulation of intermediaries by their networked environment,38
and the creation of monopoly gatekeepers resisting yet also predicting the
dominance of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft (GAFAM).39
Internet law has been approached as a private and public law, with policy
perspectives from law and economics as well as sociolegal studies. The over-
views that best introduce the topic to general readers contain contributions that
provide both a commercial and a public law perspective. Some important
31 Larouche, Pierre (2008) On the Future of Information Law as a Specific Field of Law, TILEC
Discussion Paper No. 2008-020, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140162.
32 Goldman, Eric (2008) Teaching Cyberlaw, Santa Clara University School of Law Legal Studies
Research Papers Series Working Paper No. 08-57, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159903.
33 Murray, A. (2013) Looking Back at the Law of the Horse: Why Cyberlaw and the Rule of Law are
Important, SCRIPTed, Vol. 10, No. 3, 310, at http://script-ed.org/?p=1157.
34 See, for instance, Marsden, Chris (2012) Oxford Bibliography of Internet Law, New York: Oxford
University Press.
35 Lemley, Mark and McGowan, David (1998) Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
California Law Review, Vol. 86, 479, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=32212.
36 Lessig, Lawrence (1999) Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic Books.
37 Benkler, Yochai (2002) Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, Yale Law Journal, Vol.
112, 369, at www.benkler.org/CoasesPenguin.html.
38 Wu, Tim (2003) When Code Isn’t Law, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, 679, at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=413201.
39 Zittrain, Jonathan (2006) The Generative Internet, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 119, 1974, at papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=847124.
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contributions have focused on US law and policy,40 and relatively few works
provide a trans-Atlantic context.41
Theworld has changed less than we think it has in the last generation, and the battle
between tyranny and freedom is eternal and geographical.42 Both the twenty-first-
century Internet and the nineteenth-century telegraph are controlled by the Five Eyes
(the Anglo-American powers and their former colonies in Singapore and Oceania).
While the reach of international human rights law was severely limited in the nine-
teenth century, largely a matter of humanitarian aspects of the law of war and the
extraterritorial application of domestic anti-slavery laws by the hyper-power Great
Britain, we now live in what are claimed to bemore enlightened times. The cabling of
the planet for the Internet uses much the same undersea telegraph lanes and devel-
opments from those technologies. The first Internet link outsideNorth America was to
Norway (as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance) in 1973. We have wired Africa
and have an interplanetary Internet. Geography matters, and so does territorial
sovereignty. Information flows through those cables, and whoever controls the cables
controls the information. The tapping of telegraph lines and blocking of encrypted
messages was de rigueur in theVictorian era but this policy has been challenged under
international human rights law in the twenty-first century.
The likelihood that multistakeholder civil society is able to exercise useful
scrutiny and control over hyper-power politicians and their obedient corporate
clients or partners may appear remote, and the call for international norms for
human rights law quixotic. It could mark what some might call a tectonic shift in
governance of communications. Cables may girdle the Earth in only 66.8 light
milliseconds, but we continue to observe covert Internet surveillance in the shadowy
half-light of governance of the corporations and surveillance agencies that have for
so long controlled our information.43
part 2: a very short internet liability legislative history
These foundational rules for the adaptation of liability online focused on absolving
faultless (and low fault, the line is shifting) intermediaries of liability for end user-posted
40 Lemley, Mark, Menell, Peter S., Merges, Robert P., and Samuelson, Pamela (2011) Software and
Internet Law, Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Law & Business, 4th ed.; Thierer, Adam (ed., 2003) Who
Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction, Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
41 Yaman, Akdeniz, Walker, Clive, andWall, David (eds., 2001) The Internet, Law and Society, London:
Longman; Edwards, Lilian and Waelde, Charlott (eds., 2009) Law and the Internet, 3rd ed., Oxford:
Hart Publishing; Marsden, Chris (ed., 2000) Regulating the Global Information Society, London:
Routledge; Hedley, S. (2006) The Law of Electronic Commerce and the Internet in the UK and Ireland,
London: Routledge-Cavendish.
42 Marsden, Chris (2004) Hyperglobalized Individuals: the Internet, Globalization, Freedom and
Terrorism, Foresight, Vol. 6, No. 3, 128–40.
43 Marsden, Chris (2014) Hyper-Power and Private Monopoly: the Unholy Marriage of (Neo)
Corporatism and the Imperial Surveillance State, Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol.
31, No. 2, 100–108, at www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15295036.2014.913805.
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content. More than two decades after ACLU v. Reno and the ‘Information
Superhighway’ metaphor of Al Gore and Bill Clinton’s first term is as useful a time as
any to look back to the future. Settled policies were arrived at as a result of expert
testimony and exhaustive hearings, on liability, privacy, trust, encryption, open Internet
policies against filtering. Changing those policies now may result in potentially cata-
strophic untying of the Gordian knots of intermediary safe harbour, privacy, copyright
enforcement, and open Internet European regulations.
The legislation that underpins intermediary liability was introduced in an extra-
ordinary ‘dot-com’ boom in the period 1996–1999, frequently dated to start on
12 April 1996, when Yahoo! underwent an initial public offering, shares making
270 per cent profit for investors on a single day. The growth of Yahoo! reflects the
heady valuations of Internet stocks in the period with its peak at $118.75 a share on
3 January 2000 crashing to $8.11 on 26 September 2001 – lower than the price of its
IPO.44 The rise and fall of broader telecoms stocks (the Internet’s infrastructure
plumbing) of about forty-two months was documented by Malik as amounting to an
excessive valuation of about $750 billion.45 A regulatory outcome of the large-scale
fraud, accounting irregularity, and generalized lack of regulation in that period is the
lack of proper investigation to learn the lessons of that boom and bust beyond the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.46 This may have contributed in small part to the failure of
regulation, and far greater losses, of the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008–2009 and the ‘Age
of Austerity’ that followed.47
Two myths need rebutting to understand the ‘self-regulatory settlement’ of Internet
law.Thefirst is that theUnitedStates settled on self-regulation and ahands-off approach.
While this was the spirit of the Digital Tornado paper, it was very much unreflective of
the 104th Congress that voted through the Communications Decency Act as part of the
Telecommunications Act 1996.48 In the US, liability regimes have differed according to
speech-based and copyright-based liabilities. Communications Decency Act 1996 s.230
provides that ‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
44 Odlyzko, Andrew (2003) Pricing and Architecture of the Internet: Historical Perspectives from
Telecommunications and Transportation, December 29, at www.dtc.umn.edu/»odlyzko. For Yahoo!
rise and fall, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahoo!#Expansion.
45 See, generally, Malik, Om (2003) Broadbandits: Inside the $750 Billion TelecomHeist, Wiley & Sons.
46 Pub. Law No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et seq. (2003).
47 Wren-Lewis, Simon (2015) The Austerity Con, London Review of Books, Vol. 37, No. 4, 9–11. UK
neoliberal austerity lasted until 2018, in contrast to the US under President Obama’s stimulus
programme from 2010. For a US perspective, see Paul Krugman (2015) The Austerity Delusion, The
Guardian, 29 April, at www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-
delusion; Romano, Roberta (2004) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 3, at http://lsr.nellco.org
/nyu_lewp/3.
48
47 U.S.C. § 230. See Cannon, Robert (1996) The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s
Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, Federal
Communications Law Journal, Vol. 51, 74.
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provider.’49 This language might shield ISPs from liability for subscriber copyright
infringement as well. However, Section 230(e)(2) specifically states: ‘Nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.’
Section 230 established the concept of limited liability.50 The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act 1998 s.512 laid out detailed rules for copyright infringement and the action
required of intermediaries when notice of infringement, as paid out in DMCA, was
sent. The introduction on 30 June 1995 of the Internet Freedom and Family
Empowerment Act to amend the omnibus Telecommunications Act of 1934, was
designed in part to mandate filters against adult pornography in all United States’
households, and the eventual law as amended was voted through 420–4 on
4 August 1995,51 remaining the federal law until part struck down in the famous
ACLU v. Reno Supreme Court case on 26 June 1997.52
This non-filtered Internet regime, which arrived by accident as a result of con-
stitutional convention, has been developed over time, and maintains a significant
degree of difference from the gradually less permissive intermediary regime now
permitted in the European Union.53 Note that the 105th and 106th Congress were
largely obsessed with attempting to impeach President Clinton for perjury, related to
a sexual misconduct that was first publicized via that unrestricted Internet that
Congress had attempted to control in 1995–7.54 Attempts to reform the law in the
period 2000 onwards were partially successful in restricting government-funded
Internet services in for instance libraries, e.g. Children’s Internet Protection Act
2001,55 although statutes such as Child Online Protection Act 1998 were struck
down by the Supreme Court.56
There is thus a patchy history of US federal legislators attempting to restrict
Internet harms and place restrictions on Internet access, struck down by the
Supreme Court defending individual liberty against censorship.57 In the absence
of an active Supreme Court, Europe’s lawmakers have faced fewer restrictions on
controlling the Internet, although the liability regime is only modestly different. As
Holznagel indicates, US courts have applied ‘safe harbour’ provisions to widely
49
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
50 The Communications Decency Act was Part V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in which
S.222 deals with privacy and transparency.
51 On the roll call vote, see www.congress.gov/amendment/104th-congress/house-amendment/744.
52 ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, overturned s.223. Rappaport, Kim L. (1997) In the Wake of Reno
v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet
Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, American University International Law Review, Vol.
13. 765.
53 Guadamuz, Andres (2018) Chapter 1: Internet Regulation, inLilian Edwards (ed.) Law, Policy and the
Internet, Oxford:Hart/Bloomsbury Publishing.
54 DrudgeReport Archives (1998), Newsweek Kills Story On White House Intern, 17 January, at www
.drudgereportarchives.com/data/2002/01/17/20020117_175502_ml.htm.
55 Upheld in United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
56 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
57 Goldman, Eric (2018) An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in Giancarlo
Frosio (ed.)Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306737.
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protect Internet service providers (ISPs), even where [a] it was aware of unlawful
hosted content; [b] if it had been notified of this by a third party; [c] if it had paid for
the data.58 According to Yen: ‘[T]he general philosophy motivating these decisions –
namely, that the liability against ISPs for subscriber libel would result in undesirable
censorship on the Internet – remains vitally important in assessing the desirability of
ISP liability.’59 Despite multiple recent proposals to amend the limited liability safe
harbour of s.230 Communications Decency Act to counter ‘revenge porn’, disin-
formation and terrorist content, the broad exemption from liability for ISPs has
continued into 2020.60 Frydman and Rorive see courts as ‘in line with the legislative
intent . . . applied the immunity provision in an extensive manner’.61
The second myth that needs exposing is that Europe was entirely reactive to the US
Internet liability regime. While it is true that European telecoms were only formally
liberalized in 1998, moves to regulate liability for online services predate the public
Internet. European consumer Internet use roughly dates to 1998, with the opening of the
Telecoms Single Market, and broadband to 2000, with the Local Loop Unbundling
Regulation.However, a high-level group of experts led by Professor Luc Soetewas set up
in May 1995 to advise the European Commission on ‘social and societal changes
associated with the Information Society’, which set out over one hundred initial policy
suggestions in January 1996, including the infamous ‘bit tax’ to prevent e-commerce
eroding the local tax base.62 Among these suggestions was a recommendation to
investigate further ‘appropriate ways in which the benefits of the Information Society
can be more equally distributed between those who benefit and those who lose’. Given
the upheavals of the ‘zero hours’ precariat economy of the 2010s, and the scandals of
Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Facebook and other multinationals’ failure to pay tax on in-
country activities, the bit tax may be returning in 2020.63
In the German Teleservices Act of 199764 and Bavaria v. Felix Somm
(Compuserve) case,65 Germany showed that it wished to see a similar limited
liability regime to that in the US. This led with British support to adoption of the
58 Holznagel, B. (2000) Responsibility for Harmful and Illegal Content as Well as Free Speech on the
Internet in the United States of America and Germany, in C. Engel and H. Keller (eds.)Governance
of Global Networks in Light of Differing Local Values, Nomos: Baden Baden.
59 Yen, Alfred (2000) Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability and the First Amendment, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol, 88, 1.
60 Holznagel, supra note 58.
61 Frydman, B. and Rorive, I. (2002) Regulating Internet Content Through Intermediaries in Europe
and the USA, Zeitschrift fur Rechtssoziologie Bd.23/H1, July 2002, Lucius et Lucius.
62 CORDIS (1996) The ‘Bit Tax’: The Case for Further Research, at https://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/
6988/en. The bit tax is a tax on the transmission of information by electronic means – literally, on bits.
63 Dickson, Annabelle (2018) UK to Introduce ‘Google Tax’ in 2020, Politico, 29 October, at www
.politico.eu/article/uk-to-bring-in-digital-services-tax-in–2020/.
64 Also known as the Information and Communications Services Act (Informations- und
Kommunikationsdienstegesetz – IuKDG). See IRIS Legal Observations of the European
Audiovisual Observatory, IRIS 1997-8:11/16, at http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/1997/8/article16.en.html.
65 Bender, G. (1998) Bavaria v. Felix Somm: The Pornography Conviction of the Former CompuServe
Manager, IJCLP Vol. 1, at www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/1_1998/ijclp_webdoc_14_1_1998.html.
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Electronic Commerce Directive of 2000, creating the Digital Single Market in
e-commerce. 1999 seems very late in the dot-com boom – but the legislative history
of the ECD is directly traceable to 16 April 1997, months before the Teleservices Act
was finally ratified. The coordination of US and European lawmaking came in the
International Ministerial Conference ‘Global Information Networks: Realizing the
Potential’ in Bonn (then the German capital city) on 6–8 July 1997, which addressed
‘international policy-making amongst others for electronic commerce with a view to
adopting a Ministerial Declaration’.66 As with the US Telecommunications Act
1996, it was an eighteenth-month legislative process.
‘Safe harbour’ protection of ISPs from liability was only implemented on
17 January 2002, when the ECD came into force. Article 12 protects the ISP where
it provides ‘mere conduit’ with no knowledge of, or editorial control over, content or
receiver (‘does not initiate [or] select the receiver’). Benoit and Frydman establish
that it was based on the 1997 German Teleservices Act, albeit with ‘slightly more
burden on the ISPs in comparison with the former German statute’.67 Where ISPs
provide hosting services, under Article 14, they are protected from liability, in two
ways:
1. the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information
and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which the illegal activity is apparent; or
2. the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously
to remove or to disrupt access of the information.
Like the proverbial three blind monkeys, ISPs and web hosting services should ‘hear
no evil, see no evil, speak no evil’.68 As mere ciphers for content, they are protected;
should they engage in any filtering of content, they become liable. Thus masterly
inactivity except when prompted by law enforcement is the economically most
advantageous policy open to them. Frydman and Rorive state ‘undoubtedly the
Directive seeks to stimulate coregulation’. It does this by formally permitting
national courts to override the safe harbour in the case of actual or suspected breach,
of national law, including copyright law.
Whereas in the US, the absolute speech protection of the First Amendment and
procedural concerns mean that Notice and Take Down is counter-balanced by ‘put
back’ procedures, in Europe, where no such protection of free speech exists, speech
freedom is qualified by state rights. In both jurisdictions, Notice and Take Down
regimes cause Frydman and Rorive to state that: ‘[T]his may lead to politically
correct or even economically correct unofficial standards that may constitute an
66 See IP/97/313 Brussels, 16 April 1997: Electronic Commerce: Commission presents framework for future
action, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-97-313_en.htm?locale=en.
67 Frydman and Rorive, supra note 61, at 54.
68 Marsden, C. (2011) Network Neutrality and Internet Service Provider Liability Regulation: Are the
Wise Monkeys of Cyberspace Becoming Stupid? Global Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1–12.
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informal but quite efficient mechanism for content-based private censorship.’69 It is
clear that the economic incentive for ISPs is simply to remove any content notified,
otherwise do nothing to monitor content, and let end users, the police and courts,
and ultimately the ethics of the content providers decide what is stored and sent over
their access networks. Frydman and Rorive state that: ‘Business operators should
never be entrusted with . . . guidelines defining the limits of the right to free speech
and offering procedural guarantees against censorship . . . which belong to the very
core of the human rights of a democratic people.’70That is nevertheless the situation
that ISP Codes of Conduct seek to self-regulate.
Could a stronger case be made to make ISPs responsible for a class of their
content, where it serves their commercial benefit? This is an idea that was suggested
in the 1990s, before the CDA and ECD supplanted the idea. It has returned in the
US with Balkin and Zittrain’s concept of information fiduciaries,71 adapted to
Europe in Perrin and Woods’ recent work on duty of care.72
Vicarious liability tests the ability to benefit and control [i] the right and ability to
supervise and [ii] a financial direct interest. This tends to make ISPs choose not to
monitor even for law enforcement. The financial direct benefit is interesting in view
of the ‘killer application’ for broadband deployment in the 2000s: Did this include
peer-to-peer if the access charges received by the ISP is based on traffic i.e. adverts on
portal or bandwidth usage? ISPs arguably benefitted from the existence of copyright
infringement on the Internet. Thousands of users desired Internet service precisely
because it offers free access to copyrighted materials. As Yen argued, an ISP (like the
Polygram trade show operator73) could make copyright compliance part of its system
rules and thenmonitor for violations.74TheViacom v. YouTube case in 2010 failed to
fully establish the burden in such cases.75
Similar controversies have arisen beyond content and intellectual property. The
landmark 2000 French criminal case of Yahoo v. LICRA, confirmed that US multi-
nationals must conform to national criminal law on hate speech.76 With regard to
privacy, in 2000, the Europeans and US published the ‘safe harbour’ agreement.
69 Frydman and Rorive, supra note 61, at 56.
70 Ibid at 59.
71 Balkin, Jack andZittrain, J. (2016) A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy? The
Atlantic, October, https://perma.cc/WW5N-98UZ.
72 Perrin,W. andWoods, L. (2018)Harm reduction in social media – what can we learn from other models
of regulation? Carnegie Trust, www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/blog/harm-reduction-social-media-can-
learn-models-regulation/. For criticism, see Smith, Graham (2018) Take care with that social media
duty of care, InforrmBlog, 23October, https://inforrm.org/2018/10/23/take-care-with-that-social-media-
duty-of-care-graham-smith/.
73 Polygram International Publishing v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1317-18 (D. Mass. 1994).
74 Yen, supra note 59, at 19.
75 Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103, US District Court for the Southern
District of New York, settled in 2013.
76 Reidenberg, J. (2005) Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
Vol. 153, 1951, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=691501.
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Negotiated from 1998, it was always legal nonsense if sound policy, and was struck
down by the European Court of Justice in Schrems in 2015.77 Its replacement, the
‘privacy shield’, is equally a sticking plaster over trans-Atlantic differences, and may
also be struck down. While this chapter will not describe any of the data protection
law developments over the last 25 years, it is noteworthy that the Data Protection
Directive78 was continually attacked as unsuitable for the Internet that it was not
expressly designed to regulate,79 so the new General Data Protection Regulation is
already subject to much attack for its failure to regulate artificial intelligence and
robotics, yet again technologies for which it was not expressly designed . . . but may
be adapted.80
part 3: the development of co-regulation
The early period of frenetic legislative activity in 1997–2001 matched the growth of
the Internet sector in Europe, which was very small and not officially measured until
1998, when it grew from 9 per cent to over 42 per cent in 2002 in the United
Kingdom, for example.81 This unprecedented growth of a single electronic medium
was driven by broadband, mobile and Wifi-enabled Internet access as well as the
growth of social media: seven in ten Europeans were using the Internet by 2010.82 By
the end of 2017, 86 per cent of European Union citizens used the Internet, with
433 million users, and 252 million users of Facebook within that number and
approximately 400 million Google users.83
77 Case C-362/14.
78
95/46/EC.
79 For which, see the Electronic Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC, which specifically regulates personal
data protection on electronic networks.
80 Regulation EU 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) OJ L119. See
Veale, Michael and Edwards, Lilian (2018) Clarity, Surprises, and Further Questions in the Article 29
Working Party Draft Guidance on Automated Decision-Making and Profiling,Computer Law &
Security Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, 398–404, at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3071679. See also O’Conor
M. (2018) GDPR Is for Life Not Just 25th of May, Computers and Law, 18 April, at www.scl.org/blog/
10192-gdpr-is-for-life-not-just-the-25th-of-may.
81 Office of National Statistics (2012) Internet Access – Households and Individuals, 2012, Figure 1:
Households with Internet Access, 1998 to 2012, at www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/rdit2/internet-
access–households-and-individuals/2012/chd-figure-1.xls.
82 OECD (2017) Digital Economy Outlook, OECD: Paris, at www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecd-
digital-economy-outlook-2017-9789264276284-en.htm.
83 Eurostat (2018) Archive: Internet Access and Use Statistics – Households and Individuals, Revision as of
15:34, 28 March, at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Internet_
access_and_use_statistics_households_and_individuals&oldid=379591.Using a group of various official
statistics, the best current source is Internet World Stats (2017) Internet User Statistics, Facebook & 2017
Population for the 28 European Union member states, at www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm.
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The European Commission has conducted continuous monitoring of Internet
self-regulation throughout the twenty-first century. A 2004 report for the European
Commission concluded:
An imperfect self-regulatory solution may be better than no solution at all, and we
must not raise our standards so high that self-regulation is never attempted. But
there are limits to how much imperfection can be tolerated, and for how long. If
self-regulatory codes and institutions are insufficiently transparent and accountable,
and if they do not observe accepted standards of due diligence, they will lose the
trust of the public and fail. There is a danger that some aspects of internet self-
regulation fail to conform to accepted standards. We recommend co-regulatory
audit as the best balance of fundamental rights and responsive regulation.84
The development of Internet regulation has been scrutinized in real time as it
developed. Self-regulation continues, and even in the absence of any new laws we
would expect the development of the Internet not to be static.85 Legislative impact
assessments of Internet law that ask, ‘What happens if we do nothing?’, do not
involve stasis. The zero option is that the Internet continues to develop.86 Self-
regulation is viewed as making standards and practices across industry that the
European Commission, or a Member State, views agnostically in legislative terms
(or pre-legislative, given the focus on areas that are emerging and which are not yet
regulated), but which intends to monitor to analyse the extent to which the self-
regulation approaches the standards of ‘representativeness’ that co-regulation is
meant to demonstrate as a best practice. The Commission’s insistence that this is
not an inevitable journey is backed by its actions in such areas as technical standard
setting.
The largest European Internet companies are United States based. Half of the
world’s ten largest public companies by capitalization are computer technology,
Internet-based advertising, media and e-commerce conglomerates: Google (trading
as Alphabet Inc.), Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM). Apple is in
the global top twenty corporations by revenues, with two Internet access providers in
the top thirty (AT&T and Verizon). Large Internet companies have very high profit
margins driven in part by their avoidance of high sales taxes, corporate taxes and
transfer pricing, as well as merger activity. The European Commission explained
84 Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (European
Commission), Programme in Comparative Law and Policy (2004) Self-Regulation of Digital Media
Converging on the Internet: Industry Codes of Conduct in Sectoral Analysis, Final Report of
IAPCODE Project for European Commission DG Information Society Safer Internet Action Plan,
30 April, Section 12.7, at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
b7c998d9-75d6-464d-9d91-d59aa90a543c/language-en.
85 Marsden, C. (2017) How Law and Computer Science Can Work Together to Improve the Information
Society: Seeking to remedy bad legislation with good science, Communications of the ACM,
Viewpoint: Law and Technology.
86 Marsden C., Cave, J. and Simmons, S. (2008) Options for and Effectiveness of Internet Self- and Co-
Regulation, TR-566-EC. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
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that: ‘Google’s search engine has held very high market shares in all EEA countries,
exceeding 90% in most. It has done so consistently since at least 2008.’87 Regulation
by states of the failings of those private actors is in general much slower, with the
Google competition breach investigated fromNovember 2010 until a record fine was
finally issued in June 2017. The actors that enforce regulation on the Internet are
thus young but globally successful multinationals, an unprecedented group of
private actors regulating speech and commerce on a communications medium. In
2017, the European Commission found all these companies guilty of anticompeti-
tive conduct:
• Apple in Ireland, and Amazon in Luxembourg, had received illegal state aid of
respectively €13 billion and €1.5 billion.
• Google abused its dominance through its search business, EC imposing
a €2.4 billion fine.
• Facebook had flagrantly breached the terms of its merger with WhatsApp in
2014, with an EC fine of €110 million imposed in May 2017.
• Previously dominant software and Internet companyMicrosoft had been found
guilty of abusing its dominance three times since 2007; fined a total of
€2.2 billion.
This total of fines is a record for any sector, as are the individual instances of fines. To
give a sense of the scale of mergers by the companies in that period, they made 436
acquisitions worth a total $131 billion in the decade to June 2017.88 These private
actors operate with enormous scale and scope, yet they are legally regulated exactly
as small commercial websites. The size and scale of their operations make their
regulation more difficult than the equivalents in other industries – for instance, the
infamous ‘Seven Sisters’ energy companies whose regulation inspired both energy
and, to some extent, environmental law.89 Such regulation between states and firms
has been termed ‘para-diplomacy’,90 and it is constantly engaged in by the GAFAM
group.
Major platforms (now including Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, Microsoft) and
access providers formed a self-regulatory group, the Global Network Initiative
(GNI), in 2008 to respond to government demands for better enforcement. GNI
members publish transparency reports which can be audited by the board of GNI,
87 European Commission (2017) Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service,
Factsheet, Brussels, 27 June 2017, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm.
88 European Commission (2017) Speech by Johannes Laitenberger, Director-General for Competition,
EU competition law in innovation and digital markets: fairness and the consumer welfare perspective, at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_15_en.pdf.
89 Sampson, Anthony (1973) The Sovereign State of ITT, New York: Stein and Day.
90 Stopford, John and Strange, Susan (1991) Rival States, Rival Firms, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; Duchacek, Ivo D. (1984) The International Dimension of Subnational
Self-Government, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 14, No. 4, 5–31, at https://doi.org/10.1093
/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037513.
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an example of self-regulation by a group.91 Google first published a report in 2010,
and reported in 2018 almost 4 billion annual copyright removal requests as compared
to 495,000 annual “right to be forgotten” delisting requests and only 16,000 annual
government content requests (affecting 221,000 websites), demonstrating that its
most substantial enforcement actions are carried out on behalf of copyright
owners.92 Facebook, Twitter (since 2012), Amazon (since 2015) and others also
produce annual transparency reports.93
Co-regulation was noted by United States Congress in 2002 to describe certain
aspects of European regulation: ‘government enforcement of private regulations’.94
It actually came fromAustralia.95The European adventure in co-regulation in wider
consumer protection legislation, as well as standards setting, was made detailed in
2002,96 and became official policy in December 2003, with the Inter-Institutional
Agreement on Better Law-Making (IIA), which defines co-regulation.97 Although
a non-legislative act, the IIA is virtually a constitutional document in European law,
and its importance cannot be over-estimated, as it agrees the rules of engagement of
the European Parliament, Council of Ministers and Commission.98 The
Commission confirms that forms of regulation short of state regulation ‘will not be
applicable where fundamental rights or important political options are at stake or
in situations where the rules must be applied in a uniform fashion in all Member
States’.
De jure co-regulation involves legislation that tells the industry ‘regulate or else’.
The UK Digital Economy Act 2010 included two specific elements of co-regulation,
for the domain name authority (Nominet) and audiovisual media services online
(the Authority for Television on Demand). De facto co-regulation exists where the
regulators have used their powers of extreme persuasion. It is an area in which the
industry players are very aware that the regulator has power. There can be de facto
co-regulation taking place alongside de jure co-regulation.
The Commission in 2005 analysed co-regulation in terms of ‘better regulation’.99
This was immediately made part of internal EC practice in the Impact Assessment
91 Global Network Initiative (2018) 2017 Annual Report, at https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/global-
network-initiative-annual-report-2017-reinforcing-a-global-standard/ and https://globalnetworkinitia
tive.org/about-gni/.
92 https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview – noting many companies have such
reports, linking to 42 others (some have since merged or discontinued reports).
93 See, for instance, https://transparency.twitter.com/ and https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/priv
acy-and-data-security/.
94 H. Rept. 107–803 – Legislative Review Activities of the Committee On International Relations 107th
Congress (2001-2002). See, generally, for US Internet co-regulation, Weiser, P. (2009) The Future of
Internet Regulation, U.C. Davis Law Review, Vol. 43, 529–90.
95 Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation, supra note 12.
96 See COM/2002/275, COM/2002/0278, COM 2002/704.
97 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (OJ C 321, 31.12.2003), pp. 1–5.
98 European Union (2016) Better Regulation, at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/better-regula
tion/.
99 COM/2005/97.
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Guidelines,100 which the Commission must follow before bringing forward a new
legislative or policy proposal.101 Price and Verhulst (2005) contained significant
focus on AOL and internal self-organization.102They identified even then increasing
realism in recognizing competition problems, emerging monopolies, and domi-
nance. Verhulst and Latzer provided excellent analysis of the types of co-regulation
beginning to develop and their institutional path dependency.103 They identify five
types of regulation, short of statutory agency-led regulation:
• Co-regulation,
• State-supported self-regulation,
• Collective industry self-regulation,
• Single company self-organization,
• Self-help/restriction by users including rankings to impose restrictions on
access to content.
Note the direction of travel: both bottom-up transformations from self- into co-regulatory
bodies, and top-down delegation from regulation into co- but not self-regulation. Also
note examples of ‘zombie’ self-regulation –where no onewill declare the patient dead or
switch off the life supportmachine. I described these as ‘Potemkin’ self-regulators, where
there was a website and the appearance of a regulator but few resources, no physical
address containing offices and little or no apparent adjudication and enforcement.104We
should note the gains and losses in the lifecycle of regulation –will self-regulation ossify if
it stays true to its principles of self-regulation? If ossificationwere to result, would itmatter
other than to self-regulatory purists if a mature self-regulator were then to be made into
a co-regulator? UK converged communications regulator Ofcom’s own managerial and
regulatory analysis of co- and self-regulation arrives at similar conclusions.105
TheEC hasmade it pragmatic to fund standards and ex ante support self-regulation
in cases where the USwould simply ex post regulate via competition law. This leads to
substantial US–European differences of approach, which may create ‘transatlantic
competition of standardization philosophies . . . [in] consumer protection systems’.106
100 SEC /2005/791.
101 This is now codified in the new Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making OJ L 123,
12.5.2016, pp. 1–14, at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:123:
FULL&from=EN.
102 Price M. and Verhulst, S. (2005) Self-Regulation and the Internet, Amsterdam: Kluwer.
103 Latzer, Michael, Price, Monroe E., Saurwein, Florian, Verhulst and Stefaan G. (2007) Comparative
Analysis of International Co- and Self-Regulation in Communications Markets, Research report
commissioned by Ofcom.
104 Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation, supra note 12, at pp. 60, 147, 222.
105 Ofcom (2008) Identifying Appropriate Regulatory Solutions: Principles for Analysing Self- and Co-
Regulation, 10 December.
106 Newman Abraham, L. and Bach,David (2004) Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public
Power: Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the United States,Governance: An International
Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 2004, 388.
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Examples of co-regulation have become frequent in this field in the 2000s, notably in
data privacy, domain name governance, content filtering, Internet security, and net-
work neutrality, as well as standard setting and social network privacy regulation.107
Both soft law and soft enforcement play a vital regulatory role which legal positivists
would be in danger of overlooking by a failure to consider the law in its co-regulatory
context.
A Beaufort scale of co-regulation was developed for the European Commission
based on the Beaufort scale of wind speed (from calm to hurricane).108 The wind in
this case is the degree to which the government was breathing on the forms of self-
regulation that were taking place. Zero was a state of calm, which would be an entirely
technical standards body whose standards were formed totally within the technical
community, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force, up to a state of storm,which
could be the forms of co-regulation that were formalized in the Digital Economy Act.
Between zero and eleven, there is a lot of room for us to see different elements of
influence that have been exerted. That wind is blowing a lot more strongly from
European governments and from parliaments towards trying to achieve something
much closer to co-regulation than to self-regulation. There are three alternatives:
1. not to regulate, but the world develops without regulation
2. to regulate all the platforms that legislators are concerned about
3. to regulate only the dominant platforms.
It is this regulatory dilemma that I consider in the final part of the chapter.
part 4: back to the future of cyberlaw in the ubiquitous
networked computing era
Internet lawyers are widening their horizons and returning to the broader notion of
being information lawyers whose interests extend beyond a public IP network. The
end of the special place for Internet law, and its absorption into media law, has been
prematurely announced. It is not only the European institutions that are becoming
excited about more Internet regulation, driven in part by self-preservation and the
rise of disinformation (‘fake news’ – sic). Reed and others question how we regulate
AI109 and dominance of the ‘surveillance-industrial’ state in these post-Snowden
/Schrems/GDPR times, pushing digital law into even constitutional studies.110
These are exciting times to be an information lawyer.
107 Froomkin, A. Michael, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and
the Constitution, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 50, 17, at www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/icann
.pdf.
108 Marsden, Cave and Simmons, supra note 86.
109 Reed, Chris (2018)How ShouldWe Regulate Artificial Intelligence?Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society, A 2018 376 20170360.
110 See, for instance, Frischmann, BrettM. (2005) An Economic Theory of Infrastructure andCommons
Management, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 89, 917–1030, https://ssrn.com/abstract=588424.
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Toput a damp squibon toomuch recurrent techno-optimismor cynicism, I argue that
most arguments for regulating the Internet andcyber-technologies today remainoldwine
in new bottles.111 The United Kingdom regulator Ofcom has called for more regulation,
and potentially a new regulator, of the Internet.112Most developed legal systems have lots
of legal regulators of information, even if none of those is entirely shiny, new, and ‘cyber’.
There is the UK Information Commissioner, Electoral Commission, Ofcom itself, the
Advertising Standards Authority, and others. There are technical support institutions
such as National Cyber Security Centre,113 and a variety of non-governmental organiza-
tions such as the Nuffield Foundation-supported Ada Lovelace Foundation, the Turing
Institute, and venerable Foundation for Information Policy Research.114 In constructing
what I call ‘OffData’, a regulator of electronic communications and content,115 we need
to learn the lessons of previous regulatory mergers both inside (OfCom) and outside
(OfGem) communications. We need to recall what is known about sectoral regulation.
UK Ofcom was set up almost twenty years ago as a result of technological convergence
between broadcasting and telephony,116 but deliberately constructed not to regulate
Internet content. It is now required to so do. This is not a moment for unique solution
peddling or an ahistorical view of the need to extend competences beyond a privacy,
a security, a sectoral competition, and a communications regulator.
While information law is maturing, and the old Internet law/cyberlaw nomen-
clature may be fading, what we do as lawyers dealing with computers and their
impact on society is growing more important. Some of the new ideas about regulat-
ing the Internet and artificial intelligence (AI) betray a naive faith in technology
companies’ intentions towards law enforcement. It is now the job of grizzled, veteran
information lawyers to help policy makers understand how to make better laws for
cyberspace.117 Hildebrandt explains the scale and scope that can create disinforma-
tion problems in social media platforms:
111 Marsden, C. (2018) Oral Evidence to Lords Communications Committee, “The internet: to regulate or
not to regulate?” Parliamentlive.tv, 24 April, at https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/4fac3ac3-3408-
4d3b-9347-52d567e3bf62.
112 White, Sharon (2018) Tackling online harm – a regulator’s perspective: Speech by SharonWhite to the
Royal Television Society, 18 September, at www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/speeches/
2018/tackling-online-harm.
113 Merging CESG (the information security arm of GCHQ), the Centre for Cyber Assessment (CCA),
Computer Emergency Response Team UK (CERT UK) and the cyber-related responsibilities of the
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI).
114 See www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/fipr-20th.html.
115 Marsden, C. (2018) Prosumer Law and Network Platform Regulation: The Long View Towards
Creating Offdata, Georgetown Technology Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 376–98.
116 Oftel (1995) Beyond the Telephone, the TV and the PC: Consultation Document. Note further
consultations were released, the last in 1998 – seen as a forerunner to the agenda on convergent
communications for government and eventually Ofcom. See Barnes, Fod (2000) Commentary:
When to Regulate in the GIS? A Public Policy Perspective, chapter 7, pp. 117–24 in Marsden, C.
ed. (2000) Regulating the Global Information Society, New York: Routledge.
117 See Kroll, Joshua A., Huey, Joanna, Barocas, Solon, Felten, Edward W., Reidenberg, Joel R.,
Robinson, David G. and Yu, Harlan (2017) Accountable Algorithms, University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Vol. 165, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2765268. See also Reed, supra note 2.
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Due to their distributed, networked, and data-driven architecture, platforms enable
the construction of invasive, over-complete, statistically inferred, profiles of indivi-
duals (exposure), the spreading of fake content and fake accounts, the intervention
of botfarms and malware as well as persistent AB testing, targeted advertising, and
automated, targeted recycling of fake content (manipulation).118
Some of the claims that AI can ‘solve’ the problem of disinformation (‘fake news’) do
just that. Limiting the automated execution of decisions (e.g. account suspension)
on AI-discovered problems is essential in ensuring human agency and natural
justice: the right to appeal. That does not prevent Internet platform operators’
suspension of ‘bot’ accounts at scale, but ensures the correct auditing of the system
processes deployed.119
Technological solutions to detect and remove illegal/undesirable content have
become more effective, but they also raise questions about who is ‘judge’ in
determining what is legal/illegal, desirable/undesirable in society. Underlying AI
use is a difficult choice between different elements of law and technology, public
and private solutions, with trade-offs between judicial decision making, scalability,
and impact on users’ freedom of expression. Public and private actors have suggested
that AI could play a larger role in future identification of problematic content – but
these systems have their own prejudices and biases. It is worth restating that neither
law nor technology is neutral: they both embody the values and priorities of those
who have designed them (‘garbage in, garbage out’).
Does the use of AI that employs algorithmic processes to identify ‘undesir-
able’ content and nudge it out of consumers’ view, provide a means for
effective self-regulation by platforms? The UK Parliament Artificial
Intelligence Committee reported on some of these issues in 2017.120 There
are an enormous number of false positives in taking material down. It is very
difficult for AI to tell the difference between a picture of fried chicken and
a Labradoodle, simply because of the nature of the attempts by algorithms to
match these things.121 It will need human intervention to analyse these false
positives. AI can be deployed, but Google and Facebook are employing 50,000
more people because they recognize that there will have to be a mixture in
118 Hildebrandt, Mireille (2018) Primitives of Legal Protection in the Era of Data-Driven Platforms,
Georgetown Technology Law Review, Vol. 2, 252, at 253 footnote 3.
119 See Marsden, Chris and Meyer, Trisha (2019) Regulating Disinformation with Artificial Intelligence
(AI): The Effects of Disinformation Initiatives on Freedom of Expression and Media Pluralism,
Report for Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), Scientific Foresight Unit of the
Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, Directorate-General for
Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament.
120 House of Lords (2017) AI Select Committee: AI Report Published, at www.parliament.uk/business/
committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/ai-committee/news-parliament-2017/ai-report-published/
(note the report is published in non-standard URL accessed from this link).
121 Reddit poster (2017) Artificial Intelligence Can’t Tell Fried Chicken from Labradoodles, at www
.reddit.com/r/funny/comments/6h47qr/artificial_ intelligence_cant_tell_fried_chicken/.
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order to achieve any kind of aim.122 Artificial intelligence and algorithms
cannot be the only way to regulate content in future.123
‘Mechanical Turks’ are people employed – subcontracted, typically – to carry out
these activities,124 in parts of the world where their own cultural understanding of the
content they are dealing with may not be ideal.125 One of the problems is that they
are responding to a perceived need to remove more content, rather than addressing
fair process and due process. Subcontracting to people on very low wages in loca-
tions other than Europe is a great deal cheaper than employing a lawyer to work out
whether there should be an appeal to put content back online. The incentive
structure will be for platforms to demonstrate howmuch content they have removed.
Transparency and explanation are necessary, but remain a small first step towards
greater co-regulation.126 Veale et al. have explained how to move beyond transpar-
ency and explicability to replicability: to be able to run the result and produce the
answer that matches the answer they have.127 The greater the transparency, the
greater the amount of information you give to those users who do not read
the terms of service online: the degree to which that helps is limited. Prosumers
are told: ‘If you do not agree to the effectively unilateral terms of service you may no
longer use Facebook.’ A better approach would be the ability to replicate the result
achieved by the company producing the algorithm. Algorithms change all the time,
and the algorithm for Google search, for instance, is changed constantly. There are
good reasons to keep that as a trade secret. Replicability would be the ability to look
at the algorithm in use at the time and, as an audit function, run it back through the
data to produce the same result. It is used in medical trials as a basic principle of
scientific inquiry. It would help to have more faith in what is otherwise a black box
that prosumers and regulators have to trust. The EuropeanCommission has used the
overarching phrase ‘a fair deal for consumers’.128
122 www.fastcompany.com/40563782/how-a-i-anxiety-is-creating-more-jobs-for-humans.
123 Discussed by Marietje Schaake MEP in April at www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/04/
algorithms-powerful-europe-response-social-media.
124 Hara, Kotaro, Adams, Abi,Milland, Kristy, Savage, Saiph, Callison-Burch, Chris and Bigham, Jeffrey
(2017) A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers’ Earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk. arXiv:1712.05796,
Conditionally accepted for inclusion in the 2018 ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI’18) Papers program.
125 YouTube Transparency Report (2018), at https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy
/overview.
126 Edwards, Lilian and Veale, Michael (2017) Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to Explanation” is
Probably Not the Remedy You are Looking for, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972855; Erdos, David
(2016) European Data Protection Regulation and Online NewMedia: Mind the Enforcement, Gap
Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 43, No. 4, 534–64, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jols.12002.
127 Veale, Michael, Binns, Reuben and Van Kleek, Max (2018) The General Data Protection Regulation:
An Opportunity for the CHI Community? (CHI-GDPR 2018), Workshop at ACM CHI’18,
22 April 2018, Montreal, Canada, arXiv:1803.06174.
128 Vestager, M. (2018) Competition and a Fair Deal for Consumers Online, Netherlands Authority for
Consumers andMarkets Fifth Anniversary Conference, TheHague, 26 April, at https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-and-fair-deal-consu
mers-online_en.
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Platform regulation is a new version of an existing regulated problem, with
potentially dramatic negative effects on democracy and media pluralism.129 In
tackling disinformation (and other undesirable uses of online communication, as
the history of electoral and defamation reform shows), not only the effectiveness of
the technological measures needs to be considered, but also raising awareness of the
individual and social responsibility for the provision and appreciation of verifiable
truthful content, by independent platforms rather than a single central authority.
Media pluralism and literacy go hand in hand with any technological intervention.
I predict that 2020 will see the implementation of hard law requiring ‘notice and
action’ within one hour of complaints about illegal content online.130 The vigorous
action on social network regulation has not happened, in spite of urging from
national and European politicians in view of terrorist content, sexual abuse, fake
news, and the other vile elements of human society manifested on the Internet.
European regulators continue to rely more on corporate social (ir)responsibility
than hard law. The European Commission record fine for Google is being appealed,
but it will have to accept some kind of co-regulation of its vertically integrated
advertising in time.
I explained in the Introduction to this chapter that Werbach’s Digital Tornado,
along with Reidenberg’s conception of lex informatica, heralded a model of limited
state but very substantial responsible collective self-regulation. Hard law, in the
shape of the proposed European Digital Services Act to be introduced in 2020, will
continue in the 2020s to be accompanied by Codes of Conduct and other self- or co-
regulatory measures. At the time of writing, the world was plunging into a deep
economic and social depression due to the pandemic, with broadband connectivity
and Internet platforms ever more vital. Even as legislatures introduce hard law to
combat their particular favourite online harm, continued emphasis will focus on
giant platforms’ self-regulatory practices. Cyberlaw has become mainstream in the
most dramatic manner imaginable.
129 A recent Bird & Bird study for the European Commission evaluated the first triennial review of Net
Neutrality in Regulation 2015/2120 – its conclusions were that the lack of enforcement to datemeans it
is too early to tell how useful it will be. But zero rating is more controversial in developing nations, not
least because the use of zero rated WhatsApp in data-poor Brazil appears to have helped swing the
Presidential election of Bolsonaro: Belli, Luca (2018) WhatsApp Skewed Brazilian Election, Proving
Social Media’s Danger to Democracy, The Conversation, 5 December, at https://theconversation
.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-proving-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476.
130 Marsden, C. (2019) Predictions 2019: Professor Chris Marsden, Society for Computers and Law, at
www.scl.org/articles/10379-predictions-2019-professor-chris-marsden.
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